Abstract -This paper develops analytical models for the avalanche characteristics of a class of block ciphers usually referred to as substitution-permutation encryption networks or SPNs. An SPN is considered to display good avalanche characteristics if a one bit change in the plaintext input is expected to result in close to half the ciphertext output bits changing. Good avalanche characteristics are important to ensure that a cipher is not susceptible to statistical attacks and the strength of an SPN's avalanche characteristics may be considered as a measure of the randomness of the ciphertext. The results presented in this paper demonstrate that the avalanche behaviour of encryption networks can be improved by using larger S-boxes. As well, it is shown that increasing the diffusion properties of the S-boxes or replacing the permutations by diffusive linear transformations is effective in improving the network avalanche characteristics.
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. Introduction
Since its introduction in 1977, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [1] has become the most widely applied private key block cipher. Initial analysis of the DES algorithm suggested that the 56-bit key size was too small and that DES would eventually succumb to an exhaustive key search using specialized hardware [2] . Recently, a hardware design to effectively break DES using exhaustive key search was outlined by Wiener [3] . Unfortunately, it is not generally known how to efficiently modify the DES algorithm to allow for different block or key sizes.
This suggests that there is a need to replace DES with an efficient, secure, flexible block cipher whose design is well understood. The results presented in this paper are a contribution to the achievement of this objective.
Avalanche is an important cryptographic property of private key block ciphers. We say that a cipher satisfies the avalanche criterion if changing a single plaintext bit is expected to result in one half of the ciphertext bits changing. Satisfaction of this criterion is necessary for the ciphertext to be random and, depending on the keying methodology, can assist in making a cipher resistant to certain statistical attacks such as key clustering attacks [4] [5] . In this paper we develop an analytical model of the avalanche characteristics of an important class of block ciphers, referred to as substitution-permutation encryption networks (SPNs). We examine the tendency of a network to display good avalanche characteristics as the number of rounds is increased and investigate the effect of modifying various design constraints such as S-box size. The objective of the analysis is to determine architectures that will allow an efficient implementation with the fewest number of rounds necessary to achieve a suitable level of security.
¡ . Background
Feistel [6] was the first to suggest that an SPN architecture consisting of rounds of nonlinear substitutions (S-boxes) connected by bit position permutations was a simple, effective implementation of Shannon's principle of a "mixing transformation" based on the concepts of "confusion"
and "diffusion" [7] . (Note that this basic SPN architecture differs from a DES-like architecture which also uses substitutions and permutations for a mixing transformation which operates on only half the block at a time.) It has been shown that this basic SPN structure can be used to construct ciphers which possess good cryptographic properties such as completeness [8] and, as shown in [9] , resistance to differential cryptanalysis [10] and linear cryptanalysis [11] . Many modern block ciphers, including DES [1] , FEAL [12] , LOKI [13] [14] , and IDEA [15] [16], while deviating from the basic SPN model, are based on Shannon's fundamental concepts. In this paper we consider the basic SPN model because, compared to other ciphers, it is a simple but elegant structure for which it is generally possible to prove security properties.
In general, we shall consider an 
, and
. The interconnection between consecutive rounds of S-boxes is typically achieved by a permutation of the bit positions from the output of a round to the input of the next round such that no two output bits of an S-box are connected to one S-box in the next round.A simple example of an SPN is illustrated in Figure 1 with
In general, the SPN cipher may be keyed by applying key bits to the S-boxes using one or both of the following methods:
(1) selection keying: key bits are used to select which mapping from a set of mappings is to be used for a particular S-box, and (2) XOR keying: key bits are XORed with the network bits prior to entering an S-box.
Since, by definition, the avalanche characteristic of a cipher assumes that the cipher key is fixed, the method of keying the S-boxes does not affect the analysis in this paper. Hence, in this paper we do not address the issue of keying the cipher. However, the relationship between key avalanche and a key clustering attack is thoroughly discussed in [5] .
When considering the avalanche characteristics of a block cipher, we are interested in the bit changes or XOR differences within the network when two plaintexts, .
It is apparent that the avalanche criterion and SAC are very similar. SAC imposes the extra conditions that a particular plaintext bit is changed and all ciphertext bits are equally likely to change given the one bit plaintext change. Therefore, although a network satisfying SAC must satisfy the avalanche criterion, satisfaction of the avalanche criterion does not necessarily imply satisfaction of SAC.
The avalanche criterion and SAC are of interest in the design of ciphers since the satisfaction of these criteria is a necessary condition for the randomness of the ciphertext. However, it should be noted that satisfaction of these criteria is not sufficient to ensure the security of the cipher.
For example, the powerful cryptanalysis techniques of differential and linear cryptanalysis have been very effective on ciphers which have been shown to reasonably satisfy SAC. In particular, although DES has been found experimentally to reasonably satisfy SAC after a modest number of rounds [18] • a network which has a specified fixed permutation between rounds
In either case, the identity permutation is used before and after the last round of S-boxes.
For both network models, we assume any set of one or more input bit changes to an S-box results in the number of output bit changes represented by the random variable , i.e., . Note that the S-box model essentially represents an average over all randomly selected S-boxes and is not intended to characterize the behaviour of an actual physically realizable S-box. However, as experimental evidence suggests, modelling the number of output changes of each S-box as a random variable appears to be a suitable approximation when considering an SPN constructed using randomly selected fixed S-boxes.
For ease of notation, throughout the paper we will represent the probability of a specific value 
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affected by an input bit change and, therefore, from the total probability theorem, we have
Hence, the probability distribution of interest is given by
In our methodology, it is necessary therefore to determine an expression for the two conditional probabilities: 
where ¡ ! $ ¥
and ¢ £ ¥ ¡ A¦ $ is determined as in Lemma 2. Equation (6) If the properties are symmetric, the number of objects which possess exactly
, is given by 
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Consider now the determination of
, the probability distribution of output changes of the round S-boxes given that the inputs to § S-boxes are affected by changes from round
is the number of output changes,
-th S-box that has had an input change. Define
to represent the values of ! for which there are a total of ¥ § output bit changes. It may be seen that
where
represents the probability of a particular ! occurring. Since each S-box operates independently, we have 
. Therefore, 
However, in order to establish the foundation for the remainder of the analysis in the paper, we have explicitly examined the calculation of (17) is reasonable. However, in cases where very large networks are of interest, equation (18) may be used as a more efficient means of computation.
Using equations (5), (6) , and (17) we can now recursively determine the probability distribution of bit changes and thereby determine the expected number of bit changes after round
given an initial distribution of 
(b) Model B -Deterministic Permutation
In general, modelling the avalanche characteristics of an SPN with a given fixed permutation is a more difficult problem than the stochastic permutation case. The approach to the problem depends on the permutation. One particularly interesting class of permutations was identified by
Ayoub [27] . This class is similar to the permutation structure introduced by Kam and Davida [8] as a methodology for providing completeness for networks which satisfy~ . In this section we consider two useful permutation structures belonging to the class of CEP.
In order to simply describe the permutations we introduce the concept of bit partitions. Theb its of an SPN round may be divided into partitions of 
The network of Figure 1 uses a Type I permutation. Figure 2 illustrates an SPN utilizing a Type II permutation for which~
Permutation Type I:
The recursive model for permutation Type I is based on finding the probability distribution of the number of affected S-boxes in a round given the probability distribution of the number of affected S-boxes in the previous round. Therefore, we are interested in determining The probability that at least 
Assuming an initial probability distribution of 
it is simple to recursively calculate 
The probability distribution of bit changes for a particular round can be determined by equation (4) where
A is determined as in equation (17). As before, the tendency of a network to satisfy the avalanche criterion as the number of rounds is increased can be examined by calculating the expected bit changes after each round, E
Note that, since we assume that the S-box properties are symmetric and the permutation is symmetric, any variation between the probabilities of different output bits changing are eliminated after the second round and, hence, the SAC nature of a network using permutation Type I can be considered to be given by E 
Permutation Type II:
The model for this scenario determines the probability distribution of bit changes per round by recursively considering the probability distribution of an unordered list of the number of S-boxes with input changes per partition. 
where 8 is the set of 9 # which, when the weights of their elements are sorted, correspond to @ # . As implied by Lemma 3, we can determine " # $ A % # ¥ ' ( " ) using equation (22) . Note that the denominator in the product term is necessary since we are only interested in one particular selection of B " # S-boxes for each 9 # in the summation.
Let C represent the set of all possible @ # . The probability of @ # can be calculated using
and letting E D
The probability of bit changes for round y is simply calculated from
and , ¢ , £ , and ¥ ¤ are defined as before and E D F is determined as in equation (14). Again, the avalanche behaviour of the network may be determined by E ¦ § © . It should be noted that the methodology of equations (27) to (33) 
(c) Results
The resulting graphs of expected bit changes as a function of the number of rounds in the network are presented in Figure 3 for both model types applied to a network with 5 4 7 6 based on 6 9 8 @ 6
and A 8 B S-boxes. Note that in all cases the expected number of bit changes approaches the ideal number of C 1 D $ E ! ) F $ as the number of rounds in the network is increased. As well, there is only a small difference in the performance of Model A and Model B, implying that little advantage is gained in using an optimal set of permutations.
It is apparent that the network composed of A 8 B S-boxes satisfies the avalanche criterion in fewer rounds than the network composed of 6 G 8 6 S-boxes. Define H to be the error of an I round network from perfectly satisfying SAC such that In order to assess the validity of the analytical methods used, Figure 3 
. Improving Avalanche Characteristics of Networks
In this section we consider two methodologies for improving the avalanche characteristics of SPNs: (1) improving the diffusion characteristics of the S-boxes and (2) using a diffusive linear transformation between rounds of S-boxes. In both cases, we assume that the permutation is stochastic so that the analysis is tractable and since Figure 3 suggests that a stochastic permutation is a good approximation of a deterministic permutation model.
(a) Diffusion Characteristics of S-boxes
The avalanche characteristics of an SPN may be improved by selecting S-boxes for the network which have strong diffusion characteristics, i.e., the property that a small input change leads to a large output change. For example, one property which improves the diffusion characteristics of an S-box is the property that we refer to as guaranteed avalanche (GA).
Definition 3:
An S-box satisfies the property of guaranteed avalanche of order if, for a one bit input change, at least output bits change, i.e.,
Note that a guaranteed avalanche of order b is not possible in a bijective S-box since there are S-box input changes such that
and only one S-box output change satisfying ¡ ¢¦ ¤ § . Guaranteed avalanche order 2 is an acknowledged DES S-box design criterion [28] .
Consider the S-box model of equations (1) and (2) . In order to modify the model to create a general model for an S-box which satisfies guaranteed avalanche of order , we shall apply equation (1) and replace equation (2) We can determine the probability using 
The probability
To improve the efficiency of the algorithm calculating the conditional probability, we can conveniently consider unordered arrangements of the elements of the vector pair % !% # avalanche. However, it is important to stress that it is unclear whether it is possible to find S-boxes that satisfy high orders of guaranteed avalanche and that still reasonably satisfy other known design criteria such as nonlinearity [29] .
(b) Linear Transformations Between Rounds
It is also possible to improve the avalanche characteristics of a block cipher based on Shannon 
Using such a transformation between rounds is useful in rapidly diffusing bit changes within the network as is seen in the following lemma. 
Hence, using the linear transformation of equation (46) S-boxes. Further it is shown that strengthening the diffusion properties of the S-boxes or using a diffusive linear transformation between rounds can improve the avalanche characteristics of the network, facilitating the construction of efficient ciphers with fewer rounds required for adequate security.
